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REGIONAL VERSUS INTER-REGIONAL EFFICIENCY IN 
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS 
Gunter Schramm I 
INTRODUCTION 
This discussion invest igates the question whether the introduction of 
compensation payments for resource  t ransfe rs  between independent regions 
with unequal endowments of r e sources  such as water  would lead to an efficient 
in te r - reg iona l  allocation and utilization pat tern of these resources .  
The basic assumption underlying the analysis is that the respect ive  
regions have e i ther  complete or part ial  jur isdict ion or  ownership r ights over  
these r e sources  so that they themselves  could determine or  at least  substan- 
t ially influence existing and future util ization pat terns.  Given this c r i t e r i a ,  
the definition "region" would mean a special  poli t ical  subunit such as an 
individual water  dis t r ic t ,  it could mean an individual state or province forming 
part  of a l a rge r  national unit, or  it could r e f e r  to a sovereign country such as 
Canada or the United States. 
Regional efficiency, then, can be defined as the maximizat ion of net 
benefits accruing to the region i tself  f rom the util ization of the par t icular  
r e source  within or  without its own boundaries,  whereas in ter - regional  
efficiency r e f e r s  to the maximizat ion of total net benefits for all affected 
regions combined. The analysis will be conducted in t e rms  of usual benefi t -  
cost  terminology,  with net benefits r e f e r r ing  to the present  value of the sum of 
public and pr ivate  total benefits minus the sum of public and pr ivate  total 
costs.  However, such a definition r a i ses  three important issues.  
The f i r s t  is the question of the appropriate rate or ra tes  of discount, a 
question which has found much attention in the l i te ra ture  without resul t ing in a 
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final consensus. 2 In this paper the problem will be disregarded on the assump- 
tion that an appropriate ra te  has been found. 
The second is the problem of the relevant  opportunity costs of foregone 
a l ternat ives .  It will be shown that the range and magnitude of these opportunity 
costs are  different for different regions,  with the resu l t  that the sum of effi- 
ciency solutions of individual regions will not necessa r i ly  be equal to the opti- 
mum in te r - reg iona l  efficiency solution. 3 This issue is at the hear t  of the 
analysis presented here .  
The third i s sue  i s  the problem of defining the re levant  regional  or in te r -  
regional  benefits as such. Standard benef i t -cos t  analysis defines net benefits 
as the excess of the value of project  outputs (whether they are  marketed or not) 
over project  costs ,  a definition which is akin to the definition of profits in the 
private sector .  However, it must be assumed that the objective of a regional  
government or authority ought to be the maximizat ion of net benefits for the 
population under its jur isdict ion as a whole. This means that total net benefits 
should include the net addition to factor incomes 4 or personal  well-being 5 of 
the region 's  population. In other words,  the true net benefits are  the increases  
in total rea l  monetary and non-monetary net value added accruing to the 
2For some recent discussions presenting divergent views see, for exam- 
ple; Committee on The Economics of Water Resources Development of The 
Western Agricultural Economics Research Council, Water Resources and Econ- 
omic Develol~ment of the West, The Discount Rate in Public Investment Evalu- 
ation, Denver, Col. Dec. 17-18, 1968; Peter O. Steiner, Public ExPenditure 
Budgeting, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1969; W. J. Baumol, "On 
the Social Rate of Discount, " American Economic Review, Sept. 1968 (see also 
the six comments on Baumol's paper inthe same Journal, Dec. 1969), Gunter 
Schramm, "The Design of a Resource Allocation Function," paper presented to 
the 3rd Annual Meeting of the Canadian Economics Association, Toronto, June 
1969, mimeo. 
3It should be noted that in te r - reg iona l  efficiency does not necessar i ly  
mean national, inter-nat ional  or global efficiency. A wa te r - t r ans fe r  scheme 
between the Pacific Northwestern states and Arkansas,  for example, will  likely 
have an in te r - reg iona l  efficiency solution that will differ from that for the 
United States as a whole. In the analysis presented here  in ter - regional  effi- 
ciency re fe r s  exclusively to the maximizat ion of net benefits for the affected 
regions.  
4The emphasis is on the word "net addition. " For example, if as a r e -  
sult of a specific resource  allocation policy the income of cer ta in  individuals in- 
c r eases  from, say $3.00 to $3.50 per  hour, the net benefit is $0.50 per hour 
minus the increase (or change) that would have taken place in the absence of 
this policy. 
5These might be environmental ,  "quali ty of life, " recrea t ional  or other 
nonmarketed benefits.  
region. 6 While such a definition of benefits is conceptually more acceptable 
than the nar rower  one of usual benef i t -cost  analysis ,  data and analytical prob- 
lems will general ly make it exceedingly difficult if not impossible to establish 
their  magnitude. 7 It is not possible within the framework of this paper to 
pursue this issue further.  However, it is an issue of great importance that 
requires  much more attention than it has received in the past. 8 
II 
THE NEED FOR COMPENSATION PAYMENTS 
Having presented these caveats let us now turn to the central  question 
under discussion here:  will the introduction of explicit compensation payments 
to a resource-owning region resul t  in an efficient in te r - reg ional  allocation of 
this resource  between regions ? This question is par t icular ly  important for the 
allocation of water resources .  In recent  years  many proposals have been made 
for the massive  t ransfer  of water from so-cal led "water- r ich"  to "water- 
deficient" regions.  9 Ranging from the proposed huge, but still  relat ively 
6The evaluation has to be conducted in rea l  ra ther  than monetary terms 
because of the possibil i ty of price changes resul t ing from the policy adapted. 
7In addition, there exist  very real  problems of defining the relevant  
range of beneficiar ies  over t ime, par t icular ly  if the problem of regional in- or 
outmigration is taken into consideration.  
8U. S. Federal  Water Resources Agencies have recognized this problem 
and are present ly  trying to find a solution. See the Report by the Special Task 
Force,  United States Water Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation of 
Water and Related Land Resource Projects ,  Washington, D. C. June 1969. 
9The best  known and most spectacular one is the 100 bil l ion dollar 
NAWAPA scheme of the Ralph M. Parsons Company which suggests the diver-  
sion of so-cal led "surplus" water from Alaska, the Yukon, Bri t ish  Columbia 
and other nor thern areas  to regions as far east  as Quebec and as far south as 
Mexico. This proposal has been strongly supported by Senator Frank E. Moss. 
It has also found qualified support in a special U. S. Senate study. For the 
proposal i tself and the supporting views see: Ralph M. Parsons  Company, 
NAWAPA, North American Water and Power Alliance, Brochure 606-2934-19, 
Los Angeles, Calif . ,  1965; Ralph M. Parson Company, North American Water 
and Power Alliance, Conceptual Study, Vol. I_I, Financial ,  Los Angeles, Jan. 
1966; Frank E. Moss, The Water Cr is is ,  Freder ick  A. Praeger ,  Inc. ,  New 
York, 1967; and Committee on Public Works, U. S. Senate, Western Water 
Developmen~ 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Wash. ,  D. C. ,  October 1964. 
A modification of this proposal which attempts to eliminate Bri t ish 
Columbia's  objection against the proposed flooding of the Rocky Mountain 
"modest" Columbia-Colorado transfer of 2.4 million acre-feet per year which 
would cost something like $i. 4 billion dollars, to the mammoth ii0 million 
acre-feet per year, $i00 billion dollar NAWAPA scheme, none of these pro- 
posals have taken into account that the present, resource-owning states and 
provinces have a very legitimate, long-term interest in retaining the flows 
of these rivers for their own, future use. i0 
As a result, all of these proposals provoked a swift and hostile reaction 
in the jurisdictions from which the water was to be diverted, ii The NAWAPA 
Trench was developed by Lewis Gordon Smith. See his Western States Water 
Augmentation Concept, Federation of Rocky Mountain States, Inc., Denver, 
Col., revised ed. 1968. 
An internal United States transfer of Snake River waters to the lower 
Colorado has been under discussion for quite some time. For a brief descrip- 
tion of the project see: Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, The 
Snake-Colorado Project, Los Angeles, undated. 
Another proposal visualizes the diversion to the Great Lakes of various 
rivers flowing into St. James Bay. For a discussion see: Thomas W. Kierans, 
Great Replenishment and Northern Development Canal, Sudbury, Ont. Nov. 
1964; T. W. Kierans, Stabilization of Great Lakes Levels and Flows ~ the 
Great Replenishment and Northern Development .Canal , Presentation to the 
International Joint Commiss ion, May 1965; and T. W. Kierans, "The Great 
Replenishment and Northern Development Canal," Presentationto the Canadian 
Electrical Association, Manoir Richelieu, Murray Bay, Quebec, June 28, 1965. 
A third group of diversion schemes investigates the potential of the north- 
ern Canadian Watersheds of the Nelson, Churchill and Athabaska Rivers as 
sources of additional water supplies to the Canadian Prairie Provinces and the 
mid-western United States. For a discussion see Edward Kuiper, "Canadian 
Water Export, " The Engineering Journal, July 1966; E. Kuiper, "Water Utiliza- 
tion in Canada," Engineering Digest, June 1967; and E. Kuiper, "Feasibility 
of Water Export, " Journal of the H~draulies Division, Proceedings of the 
American Society of Civil Engineers, July 1968. 
10The notable exceptions are the papers by E. Kuiper, ibid., which spe- 
cifically propose compensation payments for "resource value" to the water- 
owing regions. 
ii 
The following discussion should not be interpreted to mean that large- 
scale water diversions are likely to provide the most efficient solutions to water 
supply problems in the various water-short areas of this Continent. As many 
observers have pointed out, a more intensive utilization of existing local sup- 
plies brought about by improvements in existing allocation procedures may well 
represent lower-cost solutions. Such measures may consist of a greater utili- 
zation of existing groundwater supplies, a minor shift from low-value agricul- 
tural to high-value industrial or municipal water use, intensified pollution con- 
trol measures, sea or brakish water desalinization, improved techniques in 
scheme was greeted in Canada by outcries such as "Water Sharing Called 
Plunder. ,,12 The strong stand of the Columbia Basin states against the con- 
struction of the Grand Canyon Dams was in part the result of their fear that 
these dams would pave the way for an eventual transfer of Snake or Columbia 
River waters into the Colorado River system. 13 The reason for this hostility 
is easy to see. From the point of view of water-parched Arizona, for example, 
much of the massive flows in the Columbia system may look like "surplus- 
water. " From the point of view of the Pacific Northwestern States, however, 
no such surplus exists. Large flows of water can be used for many purposes. 
They can be used to turn hydraulic turbines or to dilute waste waters from in- 
dustries or urban communities. They can be left in their original state to 
facilitate the passage of migratory fish or simply for the admiration of visitors 
and tourists. When the late General McNaughton, one of the most outspoken 
critics of Canadian water transfers to the United States claimed that, "... there 
is Nevertoo much water ''14 he certainly was right to a certain degree. Only in 
those rare cases where recurring floods threaten or where undrained marshes 
reduce the value of land can we speak of "surplus" water. In almost all others 
water will have a positive value, even if this value, on a per acre-foot basis, 
is very low indeed. 
One of the important flaws of our inter-personal as well as inter-regional 
water allocation procedures  is that these allocations a r e  })ften made on the 
basis  of "need. " In any arbi t rat ion procedure,  whether government or court  
determined,  the party that can prove a g rea t e r  "need" for water  is likely to end 
up with a l a rge r  share of the l imited supply. But the "needs" for water  in 
physical  t e rms  are almost  l imi t less .  APac i f i c  Northwestern newsprint mil l ,  
for example,  is repor ted  to use process  water  in excess  of 75,000 gallons per  
ton of product whereas  s imi la r  mi l ls  in the Southern United States (in a reas  
which are  far from water  short) make do with less  than 11,000 gallons per  
weather modifications and so on. For a discussion of these views see, for 
example: W. R. Derrick Sewell, "A Continental Water Supply System: Pipe- 
dream or Practical Possibility?", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 
XXI]], No. 7, Sept. 1967, William A. Martin and Robert A. Young, "The Need 
for Additional Water in the Arid Southwest: an Economist's Dissent, " The 
Annals of Regional Science~ Vol. III, No. i, Jtme 1969; Charles W. Howe, 
"Economics of Large-Scale Transfers, " in William G. McGinnies and Brain J. 
Goldman, Arid Lands in Perspective, The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 
Arizona, 1969. 
12 
The Globe and Mail, Toronto, May 28, 1965. 
13For example,  the fo rmer  Secre ta ry  of the Inter ior  Stewart Udall once 
r e f e r r e d  to the Hualapai Dam (one of the two iproposed Grand Canyon Dams) as 
"a gun pointed at the Columbia. " F rom U.S< Congress ,  Senate, Committee on 
Inter ior  and Insular Affairs ,  Central  Arizon~ P r o j e c t ,  Hearings before Sub- 
committee, 90th Congress, Ist session, Ma~ 2-5, 1967, p. 162. 
14As quoted in Engineering and Contra#t Record , November, 1965. 
i 
ton 14 Even the best-endowed provinces  or states on this Continent will have 
lit t le difficulties to show that they could use more ,  r a ther  than less  water .  16 
Given the uncertaint ies  of future demands a regional  government would indeed 
be dere l ic t  in its duties to its c i t izens if it voluntari ly and without receiving 
compensation gave up any c la im to water  that forms part  of the original  r e -  
source endowment of its t e r r i to ry .  
One of the resu l t s  of r e source  allocations on the basis  of "need" is that 
in cases  where severa l  jur isdict ion jointly share  s t reams or watersheds the 
individual demand project ions of the various r ipar ians  will be gross ly  inflated. 
Who, after  all ,  is going to say whether land that is marginal  today may not be 
suitable for i r r iga t ion  tomorrow 717 The other resul t  is that water  diversions 
f rom one basin to another will be strenuously r e s i s t ed  by the original  owner, 
even if it is quite apparent that the value of the water  in its original  location is 
much less  than along the proposed divers ion route. 
The explicit  introduction of compensation payments into negotiations about 
in te r - reg iona l  water  allocations could great ly  help to establ ish a more  rea l i s t i c  
evaluation of regional  water  needs. 18 If the al ternat ive to an inflated c la im to 
water  is not simply the loss of this water  to somebody else but a c la im to a 
potential source of future revenue it is much more  likely that a regional  
government  will  t ry  to assess  rea l i s t i ca l ly ,  and in t e r m s  of actually foregone 
15Roll Ei l iassen,  The Economics of Water inthe Pulp an d Paper  Industry, 
unpublished manuscript ,  Engineer ing-Economic Planning Program.  Stanford 
Universi ty,  Stanford, Cal i f . ,  mimeo,  pp. 78-79. 
16For example,  in a discussion of proposed divers ion schemes,  A. F. 
Paget, Br i t i sh  Co lumbia ' s ' fo rmer  Deputy Minis ter  of Water Resources  a s s e r t -  
ed: "it  seems that we desperate ly  need to r e s e r v e  all of our water  resource  
potent ia l . - -  It is, therefore ,  ve ry  difficult for us to consider  any reduction in 
the total volume of the r e sources  we now possess .  It is cer tain,  that any such 
reduction would, in many areas ,  immediately reduce our economic advantage 
and could have a most  ser ious  and even dest ruct ive  influence upon our r e source  
management . "  From:  A. F. Paget,  Br i t i sh  Columbia 's  Water Resource  Po-  
tential ,  an address to the 53rd General  Meeting, Pacific Northwest Trade 
Association~ Portland, Oregon, Apri l  11-13, 1965, p. 9. 
17Unfortunately, the misal locat ion of r e sources  does not stop with inflat- 
ed demand project ions.  Most government  agencies,  regional  as well as federal ,  
have a tendency to accept these project ions as rea l  and to make investment de- 
cisions on thei r  bas is .  The sad his tory of inflated demand project ions for 
South Saskatchewan River  i r r igat ion water  requi rements  s tored behind the 
South Saskatchewan Dam in Canada is a case in point. 
18Lmplicitly, of course ,  compensation payments in the form of t r ade-  
offs, compromises ,  or log-ro l l ing  p rocesses  and side-payments  at the state 
and federal  level  a re  common enough. 
opportunity costs ,  the need for future water  supplies. 
The f i r s t  step needed for the introduction of such compensatory payments 
would be to find some mechanis t ic  allocation formula that would determine the 
rights to water  for the r ipar ian  states bordering a common watershed.  It 
might be agreed,  for example,  that a downstream state has ti t le to fifty per  
cent of the average s t reamflow at the border  c ross ing  point. 19 In cases  of 
outright d ivers ions ,  of course ,  such distribution formulas  would not be needed 
since tit le to the diver ted waters would r e s t  with the original owner. 20 If one 
of the r ipar ians  would like to get a l a rge r  share  of a common watershed or if 
he would like to diver t  some water f rom another jur isdict ion he would have to 
offer to pay for it. If the offered compensation were  to be higher than the m a r -  
ginal value of the water  to its original  owner arrangements  of such t rans fe r s  
could follow. If it were  to be less ,  no such t rans fe r s  would take place.  The 
likely resu l t  would be that existing water  supplies would be allocated to those 
areas  where their  expected net marginal  values are highest. It is useful to in- 
vest igate  this asser t ion in a more  r igorous  fashion in order  to see whether it 
is l ikely to hold. 
III 
THE EFFECTS OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS ON INTER- 
REGIONAL RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS: THE STANDARD CASE 
The question is: Would the explici t  introduction of in te r - s ta te  compen- 
sation payments lead to an efficient allocation of t ransferable  natural  r e -  
sources  ? 
At f i r s t  sight the answer appears to be: yes,  indeed it would. The 
19 
Such a rule sounds much s imple r  than it would be in real i ty .  Rights to 
water  would have to be established not only in quantitative, but also in qualita- 
t ive t e rms .  Agreements  would invariably be very  complex because of natural  
flow variat ions and permanent  changes brought about by s t reamflow regulations 
and other man-made changes of water  quantity and quality. Interestingly 
enough, a 50% sharing formula forms the basis  of the otherwise more complex 
Alberta-Saskatchewan-Manitoba s t reamflow apportionment agreement  for 
major  in te r -previnc ia l  s t reams  which was signed in Regina on October 30, 
1969. See also, The Financial  Post ,  Toronto, Nov. 15, 1969, p. 11. 
20However, in some cases  divers ions  might affect third par t ies  
fa r ther  downstream. These would have to be included in any sales  agreement  



























































































































































































































rationale of this answer is shown in figure 1. 21 X and Y are two independent 
regions (Provinces, states) with jurisdiction over their own water resources. 
X owns large supplies whereas Y faces shortages. OM is the maximum quail- ~ 
tity of water (in annual ffow) that could be transferred from X to Y provided an 
agreement is reached. 
The marginal netJ~enefits to region Y from increasing water transfers 
from X are given by AEB, whereas the marginal benefits to X from utilizing 
the water within its own jurisdiction are given by FEDC. Between D and O 
the yield of water to X is negative (flood damage ?). FEDC, therefore, repre- 
sents the reservation price of X. Between D and C this reservation price is 
actually negative, i.e. it would be rational for X to pay Y for removing this 
excess water. Clearly, X can be made better off by selling some of its water 
to Y provided Y is willing to pay X's reservation price plus some of its own 
net benefits. 
What will the optimal distribution be ? A trade of OH" of water is inef- 
ficient since the loss to X of the marginal unit is HH" and the gain to Y is only 
H'H". If OG" of water is transferred the value of the marginal unit to X is 
G'G"~ whereas to Y it is GG". In this case both parties could be made better 
off by trading additional quantities of water. The optimum is reached at OE' 
where the marginal net benefits EE' are equal to both parties. The minimum 
prices which X would charge for successive units of water are given by CDEF. 
To the right of E, region's X reservation prices EHF are higher than the net 
gains to Y (given by EH'B). Area CAED represents the total net gain available 
21It should be noted that the diagram shows ne__~t benefits only. This 
means that gross benefits have to be large enough to cover all water transpor- 
tation costs in addition to the net benefits shown. 
The analysis is formulated in terms of net regional and inter-regional 
benefits expressed in dollar terms. This assumes that the underlying welfare 
functions are also expressed in dollars so that they can simply be added to- 
gether in order to find total inter-regional welfare t i.e. W T = Ux(q) + Uy(Q - 
q) where W T is total inter-regional welfare Q is the total quantity of water 
available for possible transfer and U X and Uy are the respective welfare func- 
tions of regions X and Y. While this assumption is convenient for the graphical 
representation of the analysis it is not really necessary for the conclusions to 
hold. If part or all of the presumed welfare generated in a region is greater 
(or less) than the amount of dollar benefits shown the function could be weighted 
by a special welfare coefficient. This would change and/or shift the marginal 
net benefit curve of the partieular region and benefits would no longer be ex- 
pressed in dollars but in terms of the weighted welfare function. However~ 
such a weighting scheme, while it would still indicate the likely equilibrium 
trading position between X and Y may no longer represent the most efficient 
solution from an inter-regional government point of view (the Federal Govern- 
ment's, for example) if this government holds a different view of the appro- 
priate welfare weighting scheme. 
to both X and Y from the optimal water transfer OE'. How this gain will be 
distributed between the two regions will depend on the bargaining power and 
skill of the two parties. But whatever this distr~ution it appears that in terms 
of overa]l efficiency a water transfer of OE' will maximize total net benefits 
and it also appears that the self-interest of both regions will lead to just such a 
transfer. 
IV 
BENEFIT DISTRIBUTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON 
COMPENSATION PAYMENTS 
Unfortunately, it can be shown that the conclusion a r r ived  at in the p re -  
ceding section does not necessa r i ly  follow. It follows only in cases  where the 
evaluation of net benefits does not involve the private sec tor  and separate  ju r i s -  
dictions. Most of our r e sources ,  and water  is no exception, are uti l ized in the 
private ra ther  than the public sector .  Why do private f i rms  use r e sources  ? 
They do so because they expect it to be profitable.  A dryland f a rmer  will 
switch to i r r igat ion farming only if he expects that his income will  increase .  
A pulpmill,  a power company will  uti l ize water  only if it is profitable to do so. 
What this means is that part ,  and most  likely a ve ry  large part ,  of the benefits 
accruing to a region f rom a r e source  t rans fe r  will  be private benefits of the 
f i rms  and en te rpr i ses  that are  going to use them. Total regional  net benefits,  
therefore ,  will consist  of the sum of net public and net pr ivate  benefits.  But 
private act ivi t ies  can be at t racted to a region only if a minimum profit  expecta-  
tion is met .  If it is not, the activity will not take place and the resources  made 
available will not be used. 
This has cer ta in  consequences for the evaluation of regional  net benefits 
because regional  economics are  largely  open economics.  To at t ract  new act i -  
v i t ies  and new f i rms  the region must offer ra tes  of re turn  that are  competit ive 
with ra tes  obtainable e lsewhere.  Fur the rmore ,  the sma l l e r  or more  open a 
regional eeonomy is the more  likely it is that the opportunity costs of new pr i -  
vate investments to the region are  zero.  
Since this is the crucia l  point of the analysis that follows let  us elaborate 
further .  If we were  to assume,  for example,  that the re levant  region for the 
analysis would be the United States as a whole and that the United States would 
represen t  a closed economic system with no possible net capital inflows or 
outflows, then, given a ful l -employment  situation, any new investment in any 
subregion of the eom~try would preclude some other investment of s imi la r  mag-  
nitude e lsewhere .  F rom the national point of view, therefore ,  the net benefits 
of any individual investment  in any subregion would have to be caleulated net of 
the foregone opportunity costs that the funds invested therein could have earned 
e lsewhere .  However, this conclusion does not hold at the sub-national,  or 
regional level .  Let us assume,  for example,  that the State of Arizona is con- 
sidering the re levant  benefits and costs  of water  imports  for an expansion of 
i r r iga ted  agr icul ture .  Let us assume fur ther  that the land to be i r r iga ted  
could otherwise be used only for low-density eattle pastures  (or not be used at 
10 
all). With additional water supplies, the landowners could raise sufficient 
funds elsewhere (say, in the New York money market) to convert their hold- 
ings into irrigated agricultural land. Considering only the economic dimen- 
sions of this problem 22 they are likely to do so if such conversion meets their 
minimum profit expectations net of the costs of funds they have to invest. But 
these minimum expected profits must be considered net benefits from Arizona's 
point of view, 23 while, as we have seen before, they cancel out from the 
national point of view. In other words, from Arizona's point of view the o~or- 
tunity costs of funds attracted to Arizona from outside the State are zero. 
It is the necessity to meet the minimum profit expectation c~ the private, 
water-induced sector of the regional economy together with the fact that the 
regional opportunity costs of funds may, in many cases, be zero or close to 
zero which modifies the findings of our previous analysis. Let us illustrate. 
The interpretation of figure 2 parallels that of figure i. However~ we 
now have shown the minimum profit expectation of private enterpreneurs or 
corporations by distance JO or FF' respectively. To simplify the analysis we 
have assumed that this minimum is constant per unit of water utilized. If this 
rate of return (or, in terms of figure 2, the minimum net benefits as indicated 
by JO) cannot be obtained the private activity will not take place. This, from 
a national point of view would not matter since by assumption these minimum 
private net benefits represent their opportunity costs of being generated some- 
where else in the economy. As a matter of fact, these benefits represent a 
classical case of secondary benefits which, from a national point of view cancel 
out. 25 They do not cancel out, however, for the independent regions either 
22Which leaves out the important issues of perception, attitudinal 
changes, training and willingness to take risks. 
23In addition, increases in the net income of farm laborers, farm sup- 
pliers and farm products processors as well as net increases in local and state 
governmental revenue (net of additional required expenditures) should also be 
included. I.e., as has been pointed out before, the appropriate measure would 
be the net increase in value added accruing to Arizona as a whole. However, 
if the water importation policy also results in significant population in-migra- 
tion into Arizona a more appropriate measure would be the net inerease in 
value added per capita. 
24What must  be deducted, however, are the net benefits from land ut i l iza-  
tion (cattle ra is ing ?) that would accrue in the absehce of irr igation.  
25Only in cases where the resources used (i. e. the capital and labor) 
would remain idle if not invested in the water-import-induced activity would it 
be legitimate to include them as net benefits in the national benefit function. 
For a discussion of secondary benefits see, for example: Julius Margolis, 
"Secondary Benefits~ External Economics and the Justification of Public In- 





















































































































































































































































































independently or collectively if their  a l ternat ives are investments outside the 
regional governments '  jur isdict ions.  In this respect  each region as the 
resource  owner or importer  has a legit imate se l f - in te res t  in accounting for 
these benefits.  26 
We have seen in figure 1 that without the added res t r ic t ion  of a minimum 
net re turn  to private enterpr ises  the most  efficient point of water t ransfer  is 
given at E ' .  At this point total social net benefits of the last  unit of water pur -  
chased by Y is equal to total social net benefits given up by X. To simplify the 
analysis ,  let us f i rs t  assume that no private water rights impede region X's  
export water allocation decisions.  27 Let us further assume that all units of 
water which could be t rans fe r red  to Y require  private activities for utilization. 
Y, therefore,  in order  to utilize the last  unit  of water at E' must  at t ract  a p r i -  
vate activity which requires  a minimum net re tu rn  of E 'E".  Total net r e tu rn  to 
Y is E 'E.  Y, then, can tax or charge the private activity in the amount of EE" 
leaving E"E'  as the min imum re tu rn  to the private sector.  But X, in giving up 
the marginal  unit  of water at E ' ,  gives up a net r e tu rn  of EE' and, being rat ion-  
al, will require  at least  that much in compensation from Y. Y, having only 
EE" at its disposal,  is unable to pay X's  reservat ion  price out of its water 
revenues.  EE' which in te rms  of in te r - reg ional  efficiency is the optimal point 
of water t ransfer  may no longer be chosen. 
It would be argued, of course,  that Y should pay the full reserva t ion  
price of X at point E' and, by doing so, subsidize its private sector (or the 
f i rm using the water respectively).  But this would require higher taxation 
in Y which, in effect, would represen t  an income t ransfer  from the general  
taxpayer in Y to the specific private f i rms or individuals utilizing the water. 
To the extent that higher taxation levels would be required welfare of private 
taxpayers in Y would be reduced. The opportunity costs of higher taxation may 
be substantial  and could well be much in excess of the private net benefits r e -  
presented by E 'E" .  28 Only if all these costs are fully accounted for and if, 
in addition, the resul t ing equity issues between general  taxpayers and water 
users  are resolved could the rationale of subsidizing these private activities be 
decided upon. 
Only beyond point G (in the direct ion of O) will Y be able to compensate 
X out of revenues resul t ing from the water t ransfer  since at G' the remaining 
appropriable net benefit available to Y is equal to GG', the reservat ion  price 
26The same reasoning applies, for example, v i s a  vis the se l f - in teres ts  
of the United States and Canada (to the extent that capital t ransfers  are likely 
or possible between the two countries).  
27Alternatively, we could assume that X is able to buy-out or expropriate 
such private waterr ights  at their  marginal  values as given by function ID. 
28This could very easily be the case if the water-using activity is of a low- 
value type such as forage or grain-crop irrigation agriculture, and if the mar- 
ginal opportunity cost of additional taxes in region Y is high. 
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of X at this point. 29 The equil ibr ium trading position result ing from the 
minimum profit  demands of the pr ivate  sec tors  in X and Y will now be given by 
point G'.  Total in te r - reg iona l  net benefits,  which previously were given by 
area  CAE now are  reduced to CAG"G. The net loss to society as a whole will 
be GG"E. 
Even greater inefficiencies are likely to result if the importing region's 
government is forced to charge a uniform price for imported water to all of its 
customers, 30 and if it insists further on maximizing its net revenue from its 
water import activity. 31 In this case the average net revenue hmction facing 
Y is given by JGF' and its marginal net revenue hmction by JHK. Net govern- 
mental revenues are maximized at point H which means that under such a 
policy the amount of water imported is going to be no greater than OH'. 32 
Inter-regional inefficiency, therefore, is likely to be one of the results 
of regional ownership of resources. A fully developed system of compensation 
payments will help to reduce these inefficiencies but is unlikely to eliminate 
them entirely. 
291n Figure 2 the construction line JF' which is parallel to AB, has been 
drawn in such a way that JA is equal to JO = FF'. Hence G"G is equal to the 
minimum private profit expectation JO = FF'. 
3O 
This is not an unreasonable assumption although several levels of water 
prices to different classes of customers may be a more realistic one. How- 
ever, to include the latter would only complicate the argument without changing 
the general validity of the conclusion. 
31This is a common pricing and output approach used frequently by 
government-owned utili ty operations.  
32Discriminatory pricing policies to different c lasses  of users  and the 
common prac t ices  to grant quantity discounts to large consumers  in each user  
c lass  moves the margina l  revenue curve JK fur ther  to the right, however.  
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